Euclidean public sector preferences can not be induced from a strictly quasiconcave primitive utility function and a linear constraint.
Introduction
In spatial models of collective choice, individual preferences are often represented as induced preferences in policy space (or "public sector preferences").
These induced preferences are typically understood to be derived from an underlying constrained maximization involving a primitive utility function of the conventional sort (e.g., Denzau and Parks 1977 , 1979 , Diba and Feldman 1984 , and Slutsky 1975 , 1977 . Given the usual assumptions of individual utility maximization, it is well-known that the induced preferences over policy exhibit a unique satiation point (corresponding to the constrained maximum of the underlying primitive utility function) and have strictly convex level sets.
In many applications, public sector preferences also are assumed to be Euclidean; that is, the public sector preferences are not just separable, but utility declines monotonically in distance from the ideal point. This assumption drives many important results in collective choice (e.g., McKelvey 1976, Laver and Shepsle 1996, Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1984 and Koford 1989; also, see Milyo 1999) . Below, I demonstrate below that well-behaved public sector preferences are never Euclidean.
Public sector preferences

Milyo 3
The canonical derivation of public sector preferences involves a collective of individuals in an economy consisting of two publicly provided goods (z , z ) and 1 2 one composite private good (x). For simplicity, let the publicly provided goods be pure public goods; therefore, any individual citizen in the collective has three arguments in his utility function: (x, z , z ). From the perspective of this citizen, 1 2 the private good is a free choice variable and the publicly provided goods (i.e., "policies") are strictly rationed at a level chosen by the collective.
Assume a linear budget constraint and normalize prices relative to the price of x. The individual's utility maximization problem is then:
(1)
Let U be strictly quasiconcave and continuously differentiable, so that there exits a unique constrained maximum to this problem and well-behaved demand functions.
The solution to (1) is trivial when both publicly provided goods are rationed:
Finally, define the individual's "ideal point" to be the constrained maximum Milyo 4 of (1) when no goods are rationed. Denote this as (x*, z *, z *).
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In spatial models of politics, it is the convention to work with the individual's induced preferences over policy (or "public sector preferences"). is away from the ideal point. This implies that:
1 2 for all d > 0 and 0 < è < 2ð
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Making use of (2) and the definition of public sector preferences, (3) may be rewritten as:
for all d > 0 and 0 < è < 2ð
Differentiate (4) with respect to è and re-arrange terms to show that:
It will now be shown that this condition can be satisfied for only four points in any given level set (other than the ideal point).
First, consider the case when only z is fixed at some arbitrary z , while constrained maximum, (B-p z *-p ,z , z *,z ). There will be two points on any 
